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   NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 19-1984 
______ 
 
MATTHEW KOWALSKI, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-16-cv-01707) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Cynthia Reed Eddy 
____________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 16, 2020 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, PORTER, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 29, 2020) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. 
Matthew Kowalski worked for the United States Postal Service as a part-time 
Flexible Letter Carrier at the Greentree Branch Post Office in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
from 2004 until his termination in 2012.  After his termination, Kowalski sued the 
Postmaster General under the Rehabilitation Act, claiming discriminatory and retaliatory 
treatment due to his anxiety disorder.  The District Court entered summary judgment 
against Kowalski, and in reviewing that judgment de novo, we will affirm.   
I 
This case is shadowed heavily by a prior employment dispute between Kowalski 
and the Postal Service.  That disagreement arose in January 2011 out of a conversation 
that Kowalski had with his station manager in response to the reassignment of his normal 
route.  During that exchange, Kowalski expressed his stress level, which he associated 
with a recent mass shooting in Arizona.  Interpreting those statements as a threat within 
the meaning of the Postal Service’s zero-tolerance policy, the station manager placed 
Kowalski on emergency off-duty status.  As a result, Kowalski could return to work only 
upon providing medical substantiation that he was not a threat to himself or others.   
During his absence, Kowalski was diagnosed with general anxiety disorder.  After 
treating him for it, his psychologist supplied a letter stating that Kowalski was not a 
danger to himself or others.  The Postal Service accepted that letter and scheduled 
Kowalski’s return in late February 2011. 
Perhaps due to a miscommunication, Kowalski did not arrive for work on the 
scheduled date.  Instead, he appeared the next workday.  But after marking him absent 
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without leave for the workday before, the Postal Service commenced termination 
proceedings against him and later issued a Notice of Removal, which Kowalski 
challenged through a grievance.   
Kowalski and the Postal Service resolved that dispute through a Last Chance 
Agreement.  As part of that agreement, Kowalski admitted that the Postal Service had just 
cause for the Notice of Removal.  Also, he agreed that for two years he would adhere to 
all rules and regulations of the Postal Service, and he would comply with any order from 
his supervisor before disputing it.  Those terms were strict, and Kowalski expressed 
reservations about them, in part because he did not get along with one of the managers, 
Tony Piergrossi.  But ultimately, he signed the agreement and returned to work in July 
2011. 
Upon Kowalski’s return, and consistent with his apprehensions, Piergrossi became 
his supervisor.  Piergrossi disparaged and mocked Kowalski – calling him “Killer 
Kowalski,” Appx. 325, and telling other postal employees that they should wear a bullet-
proof vest around Kowalski.  (Also, Kowalski testified that Piergrossi referred to him as 
“crazy” or “nuts,” Appx. 325, but in a sworn statement, Piergrossi denies doing so, Appx. 
489, ¶ 4.)  Kowalski did not file a grievance to complain about Piergrossi’s conduct.   
On December 27, 2011, Kowalski and Piergrossi had a disagreement that became 
the undoing of Kowalski’s tenure with the Postal Service.  That day, Piergrossi ordered 
Kowalski to deliver mail on a rural route in addition to his regular route, and Kowalski 
did not do so.  Kowalski argued that the additional assignment violated the collective 
bargaining agreement, and he requested an opportunity to speak with the union 
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representative.  In a visible display of irritation, if not anger, Piergrossi denied that 
request.  Kowalski nonetheless spoke with the union representative, who advised 
Kowalski to “carry the route, and grieve it later.”  Appx. 331.  Kowalski followed a 
different course: he submitted an immediate request for sick leave asserting that due to 
his anxiety disorder, he did not feel comfortable driving.  After Piergrossi orally denied 
that written request, he threw it in the trash.  He then stated that he would have Kowalski 
fired and ordered Kowalski to leave the building.  With that, Kowalski departed.   
Due to that incident, the Postal Service began the process of terminating Kowalski.  
Another manager submitted a Request for Discipline, and Kowalski had an opportunity to 
respond.  The Postal Service then issued a Notice of Removal for his termination, 
identifying two violations of the Last Chance Agreement: (i) failing to follow instructions 
and (ii) abandoning the route.     
Through a grievance, Kowalski disputed that just cause supported his removal.  A 
‘Step B Team,’ which consisted of a representative from the Postal Service and a 
representative from the union, reviewed Kowalski’s grievance.  After finding just cause, 
the Step B Team directed that Kowalski’s termination become official.  
Kowalski next pursued his administrative remedies with the Postal Service’s Equal 
Employment Opportunity Office.  In challenging his termination, he alleged that the 
Postal Service terminated him not due to the Last Chance Agreement but rather due to his 
anxiety disorder and his osteoarthritis.  Kowalski asserted that his supervisors “provoked 
him, called him names and subjected him to numerous workplace slights.”  Appx. 46.  An 
Administrative Judge for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission resolved 
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Kowalski’s complaint without a hearing, concluding that “[a] preponderance of the 
record evidence does not prove that the actions complained of were taken on account of 
[Kowalski’s] disability.”  Appx. 189.  Kowalski appealed that decision to the EEOC’s 
Office of Federal Operations, which affirmed the Administrative Judge’s decision.  It 
determined that “the alleged incidents were more likely the result of routine supervision, 
personality conflicts, and general workplace disputes and tribulations.”  Appx. 197.   
Unsatisfied with the administrative adjudicatory process, Kowalski sued the 
Postmaster General under the Rehabilitation Act for discrimination and retaliation.  In 
exercising federal-question jurisdiction over the lawsuit, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the 
District Court determined that Kowalski had exhausted only claims related to his 
termination, and on those, the District Court entered summary judgment for the 
Postmaster General.   
Kowalski timely appealed that judgment, and we have jurisdiction over his appeal. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
II 
On appeal, Kowalski challenges only the entry of summary judgment on his 
termination-related claims.  He brings both of those claims – one for discrimination and 
the other for retaliation – under the Rehabilitation Act.  But the Rehabilitation Act and its 
amendments contain several provisions prohibiting disability discrimination, and the 
resulting statutory scheme can fairly be described as “somewhat bewildering.”  Lane v. 
Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 196 (1996).  Two relevant provisions permit causes of action against 
the federal government: Section 501 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 791) and Section 504 
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(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794).  See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1), (2).  Both causes of action 
have notable limitations.   
Section 501 requires federal agencies to submit affirmative action plans for “the 
hiring, placement, and advancement of individuals with disabilities.”  Id. § 791(b) 
(emphasis added).  It also recognizes the ability to sue for “nonaffirmative action 
employment discrimination under this section.”  Id. § 791(f) (emphasis added).  By 
limiting claims to “nonaffirmative action employment discrimination,” the cause of 
action under Section 501 is not for all employment discrimination, but only for that 
related to nonaffirmative action, meaning “the hiring, placement, and advancement of 
individuals with disabilities.”  Id. § 791(b).  
By contrast, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act permits claims for “employment 
discrimination.”  Id. § 794(d).  But it has limitations too.  First, Section 504 applies only 
to disability discrimination in any “program or activity” receiving federal financial 
assistance or conducted by an executive agency or the Postal Service.  Id. § 794(b) 
(defining “program or activity” to implicate primarily entities receiving federal funding, 
as opposed to federal agencies themselves).  Second, Section 504 does not waive 
sovereign immunity for damages claims against federal agencies or the Postal 
Service.  See Lane, 518 U.S. at 196-97; see also Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 188-90 
(2002) (holding that “punitive damages . . . may not be awarded in suits brought under 
. . . § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act”).  And third, Section 504 has a sole causation 
requirement, meaning the discrimination must be “solely by reason of . . . disability.”  
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
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Here, the parties disagree on whether Kowalski sues under Section 501 or 
Section 504.  Kowalski’s complaint did not specify either.  Nor did his summary 
judgment briefing.  In its summary judgment decision, the District Court viewed 
Kowalski as proceeding under Section 504.  And Kowalski did not challenge that 
conclusion in his opening appellate brief.  See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5) (requiring a 
statement of issues presented for review).  The Postal Service’s appellate brief relied on 
the sole-causation limitation for Section 504 claims, and Kowalski then devoted most 
prominent attention in his reply brief to argue that he proceeds under Section 501.   
Kowalski has enjoyed the best of both worlds for too long: an appellate reply brief 
is too late to identify the statutory basis for a cause of action.  See Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. 
United States, 182 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A litigant] must unequivocally put its 
position before the trial court at a point and in a manner that permits the court to consider 
its merits.”); see also United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is 
well settled that an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief 
constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”).  Without arguing previously that his claim 
was under Section 501, Kowalski cannot do so for the first time in an appellate reply 
brief.  He has not surrendered much, however, because his challenges on appeal involve 
only his termination – and not decisions made redressable by Section 501, i.e., those 
regarding hiring, placement, or advancement.   
III 
A plaintiff may support discrimination and retaliation claims through direct 
evidence, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), or indirect evidence, 
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see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  For his disability 
discrimination claim, Kowalski invokes both approaches.  He supports his retaliation 
claim with only indirect evidence.  None of that evidence brings any material fact into 
genuine dispute.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (explaining that a genuine dispute arises “if the evidence is 
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”).  And even 
viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to Kowalski, the Postal Service still 
merits judgment as a matter of law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Smith v. City of 
Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 2009). 
A. Direct Evidence of Discrimination 
In challenging the entry of summary judgment, Kowalski argues that he produced 
enough direct evidence of discriminatory animus to defeat summary judgment.  The 
direct evidence standard originates in the mixed-motive context, where an adverse 
employment decision “was the product of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate 
motives.”  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247.  For such a mixed-motive claim, “direct 
evidence” constitutes evidence that is “so revealing of retaliatory animus that it is 
unnecessary to rely on the McDonnell Douglas / Burdine burden-shifting framework, 
under which the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff.”  Walden v. Georgia-Pacific 
Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 1997).   
But this is not a mixed-motive case.  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does 
not premise liability on discrimination as a motivating factor for the adverse employment 
decision.  Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (permitting mixed-motive discrimination claims 
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under Title VII).  Rather, Section 504 requires that a disability be the sole cause of the 
discrimination.  See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).  Due to that sole-causation requirement, direct 
evidence that discrimination was a factor does not suffice.  Rather, the direct evidence 
must establish that discriminatory animus was the sole cause of the adverse employment 
decision.    
The evidence that Kowalski proffers does not meet that standard.  He points to 
statements by Piergrossi that associate ill-will toward Kowalski with Kowalski’s general 
anxiety disorder – words and phrases such as “nuts,” “crazy,” and “Killer Kowalski,” as 
well as telling Kowalski’s co-workers to wear a bullet-proof vest around Kowalski 
because he might go “postal.”  Appx. 325.  From those statements, Kowalski argues that 
an anti-disability animus motivated Piergrossi in assigning Kowalski the additional route 
on December 27.  
But that issue is immaterial.  Kowalski must prove that discrimination was the sole 
cause of his termination – not merely the sole cause of the additional route assignment on 
December 27.  And for that, he has no direct evidence.  The record establishes that the 
Postal Service terminated Kowalski for violating his Last Chance Agreement by not 
carrying the additional route as instructed by his supervisor.  It is undisputed that 
Piergrossi did not participate in that decision to terminate Kowalski.  Piergrossi did not 
issue the Notice of Removal.  Nor did he serve as the postal representative on the Step B 
Team.  And Kowalski has no evidence that any decision-maker for his termination held 
any animus toward him due to his disability, much less that any such discriminatory 
animus was the sole cause for his termination.   
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Without any direct evidence of discriminatory animus by an actual decision-
maker, Kowalski invokes, for the first time on appeal, a cat’s paw theory of liability.  
Under that theory, which derives its name from one of Aesop’s fables, see Staub v. 
Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 415 n.1 (2011), an “employer is at fault because one of its 
agents committed an action based on discriminatory animus that was intended to cause, 
and did in fact cause, an adverse employment decision.”  Id. at 421.  But the cat’s paw 
theory originated in the context of mixed-motive discrimination claims.  See id.; see also 
Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 330 (3d Cir. 2015); McKenna v. City of 
Phila., 649 F.3d 171, 176-80 (3d Cir. 2011).  And there, liability may rest on the animus 
and actions of an immediate supervisor, regardless of the motivation of the ultimate 
decision-maker.  See Staub, 562 U.S. at 422; see also Jones, 796 F.3d at 330.  
Section 504, however, does not permit mixed-motive claims; rather, it requires that a 
disability be the sole, as opposed to a partial, cause of the adverse employment decision.  
See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).  That requirement removes Section 504 claims from the reach of 
the cat’s paw theory.  Thus, even if this newly raised argument were not forfeited, see 
Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2006), Kowalski still could not overcome 
summary judgment here, where he lacks evidence of a decision-maker’s discriminatory 
animus. 
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B. Indirect Evidence of Discrimination and Retaliation 
Kowalski also attempts to defeat summary judgment on his discrimination and 
retaliation claims through indirect evidence.  The dispute here is narrow.1  It pertains only 
to the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, which, for both discrimination and 
retaliation claims, permits a plaintiff to avoid summary judgment by demonstrating that 
the employer’s stated reason is pretextual.  See generally McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 
at 802-04 (articulating the three stages of indirect proof for discrimination); Daniels v. 
Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2015); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 
109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that the McDonnell Douglas framework 
generally applies to retaliation claims). 
Kowalski argues that the proffered reasons for his termination were pretextual.  
Proving pretext requires two showings: (i) that the stated reason was false, and (ii) that 
discrimination was the real reason.  See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 
515 (1993).  This Circuit, however, has held that a plaintiff can survive summary 
judgment within the McDonnell Douglas framework by producing evidence of either of 
those two prongs.  See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994); see also 
Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc).   
Kowalski directs his efforts to the first prong – demonstrating that the Postal 
Service’s stated reasons were false.  That showing demands something more than 
 
1 The parties do not contest that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to 
Kowalski’s efforts to prove discrimination and retaliation indirectly.  Nor do they dispute 
that Kowalski’s discrimination and retaliation claims satisfy the first two McDonnell 
Douglas stages (a prima facie case and a legitimate non-discriminatory reason).  
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evidence that “the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken.”  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 
765; see also Keller, 130 F.3d at 1108.  Instead, it requires proof of “weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s 
proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally 
find them unworthy of credence.”  Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (citation and quotation marks 
omitted); see also Keller, 130 F.3d at 1108-09.   
Kowalski identifies such a contradiction with respect to the job-abandonment 
justification for his termination.  Because Piergrossi ordered him to leave work, Kowalski 
could not have abandoned his job in derogation of his supervisor’s order or in violation of 
the Last Chance Agreement.   
But Kowalski must demonstrate the falsity of each stated justification for his 
termination.  See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764-65.  And the Postal Service also terminated him 
for violating his Last Chance Agreement due to his refusal to carry the additional route 
on December 27.  Kowalski argues that he did not actually refuse to carry the route, 
rather he was requesting an accommodation.   
The Postal Service cannot be faulted for reaching a different conclusion.  
Kowalski did not originally mention a disability as the reason he did not carry the route; 
he challenged the route as a violation of the collective bargaining agreement.  And by not 
carrying the route and disregarding his supervisor’s order not to speak with the union 
representative, Kowalski violated his Last Chance Agreement, which required him to 
obey supervisors’ orders and submit grievances later.  And as a matter of law, his request 
for sick leave after the situation became more tense does not retroactively legitimize his 
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prior conduct.  See Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 
130, 137 (3d Cir. 2006) (“But as the Supreme Court has held, an employer need not 
refrain from carrying out a previously reached employment decision because an 
employee subsequently claims to be engaging in protected activity.”).  Thus, Kowalski 
has not demonstrated pretext for each basis for the Postal Service’s termination decision. 
* * * 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order entering 
summary judgment for the Postmaster General.  
